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Abstract: Asset specificity is usually considered to be an argument for vertical integration. 
The main idea is that specificity induces opportunistic behaviour, and that vertical integration 
reduces this problem of opportunism. In this article I show that asset specificity actually can 
be an argument for non-integration. In a repeated game model of relational contracts, based 
on Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 2002, I show that asset specificity affects the temptation to 
renege on relational contracts between non-integrated parties, but not between integrated 
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1. Introduction 
 
The transaction cost theory entered the stage in the mid 1970s, partly as an attempt to explain 
the fundamental Coaseian question: Why do we have firms? The question acted as a headline 
for the general problem of economic organization: How do we explain the various observed 
ways of organizing economic activity? The factors leading to vertical integration have been a 
central issue in this literature. And a factor that has received a lot of attention is the degree of 
asset specificity. The traditional hypothesis is that asset specificity leads to vertical 
integration. This hypothesis is formulated through different lines of thought. Klein, Crawford 
and Alchian (1978) emphasize the problem of “hold-up”. A party that has invested in specific 
assets may be forced to accept a worsening of the terms of the relationship after the 
investment is sunk. Hence, asset specificity creates appropriable specialized quasi rents. Klein 
et al. claim that “integration by common or joint ownership is more likely the higher the 
appropriable specialized quasi rents of the assets involved.” Williamson (1985, 1991) 
emphasizes the problem of maladaptation. As investments in specific assets increase, 
disturbances requiring coordinated responses become more numerous and consequential. The 
high-powered incentives of markets may impede efficient coordination, since both parties 
want to appropriate as much as possible of the coordination gains. Vertical integration is a 
way of reducing this kind of maladaptation. The “property rights approach”, developed by 
Grossman, Hart and Moore (GHM) (1986, 1990), does not formulate an explicit hypothesis 
concerning asset specificity, but states that if assets are strictly complementary, then some 
form of integration is optimal. GHM show that if complementary or co-specialized assets 
operate under separate ownership, the parties owning the assets will underinvest in the 
relationship.   
 
The three approaches introduced here share the common belief that there is a correlation 
between the degree of asset, or investment, specificity and the appearance of vertical 
integration. In the April 2000 edition of Journal of Law and Economics, Klein states that 
“…the rigidity costs associated with long term contracts increase as relationship-specific 
investments increase (…). Therefore, the greater the relationship-specific investments present 
in an exchange, the more likely vertical integration (that avoids the rigidity costs associated 
with long term contracts) will be chosen as the self-enforcing arrangement. All that is 
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required for this positive relationship between specific investments and the likelihood of 
vertical integration is that the relative inefficiency costs from weakening of incentives is not 
systematically positively related to the level of specific investments, and there is no reason to 
believe they are.”  
 
In the present article I will show, however, that there may be a reason to believe that the 
“relative inefficiency costs from weakening of incentives” are systematically positively 
related to the level of asset and investment specificity. The analysis draws on a repeated game 
model of relational contracts developed by Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (BGM), 2002. A 
relational contract1 contains rules or standards that cannot be legally enforced. Hence, the 
contract must be self-enforceable in the sense that the present value of honouring the contract 
must be greater than the present value of reneging. BGM show how asset allocation matters in 
the presence of long-term relational contracts. An important result is that incentives in 
relational contracts between firms can be higher-powered than incentives in relational 
contracts within firms. In a modified version of BGM’s model, I show that this difference in 
incentive intensity is positively related to the degree of asset and investment specificity.  
 
The repeated game model is one in which an upstream party in each period uses an asset to 
produce a good that could either be used in a specific downstream party’s production process, 
or put to an alternative use. Asset ownership conveys ownership of the good produced, so if 
the upstream party owns the asset (non-integration),2 the downstream party cannot use the 
good without buying it from the upstream party, whereas if the downstream party owns the 
asset (integration), then he already owns the good.  Since the good’s value to the downstream 
party exceeds its value in the alternative market, the parties agree on a relational contract 
where the downstream party pays bonuses to make the upstream party improve the specific 
quality of the good. In order to analyse asset specificity within this framework, it is necessary 
to make modifications to BGM’s model. In their set up, the parties play grim trigger strategies 
in which deviation from the relational contract results in spot governance forever after. In spot 
governance, the parties cannot contract ex ante on ex post realizations, but they can negotiate 
ex post over the price of the good. BGM assume Nash bargaining, so the price depends on  
                                                 
1 Relational contracts are also called ‘implicit’ contracts (e.g. MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989).  
2 Following Grossman and Hart’s (1986) terminology, seller ownership is called “non-integration”; buyer 
ownership is called “integration”. 
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bargaining positions, but not necessarily on the level of asset specificity (since high and low 
levels of specificity can yield the same spot price). Asset specificity clearly matters, however, 
if the parties face the possibility of actual trade in the alternative market. I analyse so-called 
carrot and stick strategies where contract deviation results in a one-period trade in the 
alternative market before return to the relational contract. These kinds of strategies, also 
called mutual punishment (Myerson, 1997), are more complex to analyse, but are still more 
realistic than the standard grim strategies. 
 
When the alternative market is a real alternative and the parties can choose between a 
relational employment contract (integration) and a relational outsourcing contract (non-
integration), high levels of asset specificity induce relational outsourcing.3 The reason is that 
increased specificity reduces the temptation to renege on a relational outsourcing contract, 
since the benefit of external trade is reduced. In a relational employment contract, however, 
the downstream owner has the residual control right to the good produced, so the upstream 
party cannot hinder the downstream party to force internal trade. Hence, asset specificity does 
not affect the self-enforcing conditions of the employment contract. This difference between 
employment contracts and outsourcing contracts makes the relative efficiency of non-
integration increase with the level of asset specificity. The reduced temptation to renege on 
the relational outsourcing contract, due to increased specificity, makes it possible to design 
higher-powered incentive schemes without running the risk of opportunistic behaviour. 
 
This link between asset specificity, contract efficiency and asset allocation seems not to be 
addressed in the theoretical part of the literature. Repeated game models of economic 
organization acknowledge that relational contracts may be a substitute for vertical integration 
in dealing with the problem of opportunism. They also recognize the role of reneging 
temptation in the design of efficient incentive contracts. But the absence of a formal 
comparison of relational contracts between firms and relationa l contracts within firms, prior 
to Baker, Gibbons and Murphy’s important contribution, has made the separating effect of 
specificity hard to identify. Klein and Leffler analyse reputation effects in assuring product 
quality in their seminal 1981 paper. The  buyer pays a price premium to the supplier to ensure 
that the supplier exerts effort to produce good quality. If the supplier reneges on the contract,  
                                                 
3 The terms ‘relational employment’ and ‘relational outsourcing’ stem from BGM 
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all his potential customers get to know, and the supplier therefore loses all future sales. 
Hence, the alternative market disciplines against opportunistic behaviour. But Klein and 
Leffler do not compare relational contracts between independent parties with contracts 
between vertically integrated parties. Halonen (2002) recognizes the importance of reducing 
outside options in order to reduce the gain from contract deviation, in her dynamic version of 
the Hart/Moore (1990) game. But she does not relate the outside options to the difference 
between specific and alternative use. Since the supplier in her model only makes specific 
investments in human capital, she relates the outside option to the investing party’s 
dependency on the asset he invests in, i.e., to what extent it is important that the investing 
party manages the asset. Hence, Halonen does not make any statements concerning asset 
specificity and vertical integration, but she recognizes that separation of strictly 
complementary assets can be beneficial in providing maximum punishment for deviation. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
The idea that putting parties in more adverse situations may promote efficiency is also 
discussed in Klein (1980) and Williamson (1983). Klein refers to the case where franchisers 
require franchisees to rent from them, rather than own the land on which their outlet is 
located. This prevents opportunism since the franchiser can require the franchisee to move if 
the franchisee cheats. Williamson uses the concept of hostages to emphasize the importance 
of credible commitment. By posting hostages, that is posting a value before the transaction in 
order to commit to the other party, one can reduce the                                                                                                                                                                                                           
possibility of opportunistic behaviour and negotiate a contract with better terms. Chiu (1998) 
relates the importance of credible commitment directly to the concept of investment 
specificity. He claims that “the theoretical prediction that integration is more likely in the 
presence of relationship-specific investments is not as robust as previously thought”. He 
shows that specific investments cause a threat to the relationship when outside options are 
attractive, not when outside options are unattractive, as the traditional hypothesis implies. But 
Chiu does not compare the effect specificity may have on contracts between integrated parties 
with the effect on contracts between non-integrated parties.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly discusses the empirical 
research on the determinants of vertical integration.  Section 3 presents the model. A 
comparative analysis is made in Section 4, while section 5 concludes. 
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2. The empiricism of vertical integration  
 
There is an impressive body of empirical research that supports predictions of transaction cost 
economics (see Joskow 1988, and Shelanski and Klein 1995 for an overview). I believe, 
however, that the empirical work does not verify the hypothesis that asset specificity leads to 
vertical integration. It is a fact that a number of quantitative case studies and cross-sectional 
econometric analyses show a positive correlation between asset specificity and vertical 
integration. But these studies do not prove that asset specificity leads to vertical integration. 
The econometric models assume that organizational form is a function of asset specificity, 
uncertainty, complexity and frequency. Organizational form is the dependent variable while 
asset specificity is one of the independent variables. The causality between the variables is in 
general not discussed.  
 
Even though many transaction cost economists claim that the vertical integration hypothesis 
has a substantial empirical foundation, a number of prominent economists question the 
empirical validity of the hypothesis. Ronald Coase has all since his famous contribution “The 
Nature of the Firm” (1937) doubted the importance of asset specificity in bringing about 
vertical integration.  He is in fact sceptical to the concept of opportunism in analyses of 
economic organization. He argues (1988) that the importance of reputation makes it unlikely 
that a party would act opportunistically even if assets are specific.  His experience is that 
businessmen find contractual arrangements to be a satisfactory answer to the possible 
problems of asset specificity. Holmström and Roberts (1998) point out “many of the hybrid 
organizations that are emerging are characterized by high degrees of uncertainty, frequency, 
and asset specificity, yet they do not lead to integration. In fact, high degrees of frequency and 
mutual dependency seem to support, rather than hinder, ongoing cooperation across firm 
boundaries.”  
 
The economic organization of the international oil industry may serve as good example of 
separated specific assets. The oil companies and their main suppliers, who design and build 
installations that the oil companies use to extract oil, always operate with separate ownership. 
But the suppliers manage capital stock and produce inputs that are highly specific to the 
buying oil companies. The inputs may be valuable to a competing oil company, but the 
technology is often tailor-made for a specific field or a specific company. The parties usually 
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agree on a so-called EPCI-contract, in which the main suppliers are responsible for 
engineering, procurement, construction and installation. The parties normally agree on an 
even split of cost overruns and savings relative to a target sum. Hence, the contracts contain 
high-powered incentive schemes (for more details see Osmundsen, 1999). It is reasonable to 
assume that these incentive schemes would not have been feasible in an integrated solution. 
The specificity of the assets and the dependency between the parties makes it possible for the 
oil companies to design strong incentives without the risk of hold-up behaviour.  
 
The classical empirical case of vertical integration has been the General Motors’ (GM) 
acquisition of Fisher Body in 1926. The standard view has been that GM merged vertically 
with Fisher Body because of concerns over specific investments and hold-up behaviour. 
Several economists now question this explanation. Coase (2000) points out that GM already 
owned 60 percent of the shares of Fisher Body before they acquired the remaining 40 percent. 
He claims that there is no evidence that hold-up occurred before the  merger took place. 
Freeland (2000) states that “far from reducing opportunistic behaviour, the vertical integration 
in fact increased GMs vulnerability to rent seeking behaviour based in human asset 
specificity”. Casadesus and Spulber (2000) argue that the merger reflected economic 
considerations specific to that time, not some immutable market failure. The contractual 
arrangements and working relationship prior to the merger, they claim, exhibited trust rather 
than opportunism. 
 
 
3. The model 
 
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy analyse an economic environment consisting of an upstream 
party (U), a downstream party (D) and an asset, where both parties and the asset live forever 
or cease to exist simultaneously at a random date. The parties are risk neutral and share the 
discount factor,d , per period. The upstream party uses the asset to produce a good that could 
either be used in the downstream party’s production process, or put to an alternative use. In 
each period the upstream party chooses a vector of n actions (or investments) 
),...,,( 21 naaa=a  at a cost c(a) which affects the value of the product both for the 
downstream party (Q) and for the alternative market (P). The downstream value is either high 
or low, where q(a ) is the probability that a high value HQ  will be realized and )(1 aq- is the 
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probability that a low value LQ will be realized. The alternative-use value can also be either 
high or low, where p(a) is the probability that a high value, HP , will be realized and 
)(1 ap- is the probability that a low value LP  will be realized. Given the upstream party’s 
actions, the downstream and the alternative-use values are conditionally independent. It is 
assumed that =)0(c )0(q = )0(p =0, so when the upstream party decides not to take actions, he 
bears no costs but also has no chance of realizing the high values. It is further assumed that 
LP < HP < LQ < HQ so that the value to the downstream party always exceeds its value in 
the alternative use. In other words, the asset is relationship specific. The first-best actions, *a , 
maximizes the expected value of the good in its efficient use minus the cost of action, hence 
the total surplus from the transaction is given by 
 
*S =
a
Max ( ) )LQ q Q c
* *é ù+ D -ë ûa (a , where LH QQQ -=D . 
 
The actions are unobservable to anyone but the upstream party, so contracts contingent on 
actions cannot be enforced. It is assumed that Q and P are observable, but not verifiable, so it 
is possible to design self-enforceable contracts, but not to contract on Q or P in a way that a 
third party can enforce.  
 
The parties can organize their transactions through different choices of contract governance 
and ownership structure. With respect to ownership structure, it is assumed that asset 
ownership conveys ownership of the good produced, so if the upstream party owns the asset 
(non- integration), the downstream party cannot use the good without buying it from the 
upstream party, whereas if the downstream party owns the asset (integration), then he already 
owns the good. With respect to contract governance, the parties can agree on either a spot 
contract or a relational contract. In a spot contract, a spot price is negotiated for each period 
and is determined by ownership structure and bargaining positions. If the upstream party 
owns the asset, 50:50 Nash bargaining over the surplus from trade decides the spot price. If 
the downstream party owns the asset, he can just take the realized output without paying, so 
the upstream party will refuse to take costly actions. In a relational contract, the parties agree 
on a compensation contract ( HLHL bbs bb ,,,, ) where salary s is paid by downstream to 
upstream at the beginning of each period, and  ib  is supposed to be paid when iQ  is realized, 
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(i = H, L) and jb  when jP  is realized, (j = H, L). For example: If the upstream party 
produces a good which yields a high value in the specific relation, HQ , and a low value in the 
alternative market, LP , the downstream party should, according to the contract, pay the 
bonuses LHb b+  to the upstream party.
4 Such a contract induces the upstream party to yield 
effort even if he doesn’t own the asset. Since the contract cannot be enforced by a third party, 
the parties will honour the contract only if the present value of honouring is greater than the 
present value of reneging.  
 
BGM’s taxonomy of organizational design is summarized as follows (see BGM, QJE pp.46 ):   
 Non-integration Integration 
Spot contract Spot outsourcing (SO) Spot employment (SE) 
Relational contract Relational outsourcing (RO) Relational employment (RE) 
 
So far, I have been following BGM’s set-up. In this paper I will compare relational 
outsourcing with relational employment using other player strategies than the grim trigger 
strategies analysed by BGM. In BGM, if a party reneges on a contract, the other party refuses 
to enter into a new relational contract with that party. Instead, they agree to trade in spot 
governance forever after. In this paper, however, if one of the parties reneges, they first agree 
on a spot price (as in BGM). In the next period, the party who did not renege punishes the 
other party by refusing to enter into any agreement (including a spot agreement) and instead 
chooses to trade in the alternative market. After this “punishment phase” the parties return to 
a relational contract (see strategy specifications below). These kinds of trigger strategies are 
in the literature referred to as mutual punishment strategies, carrot and stick strategies, or two-
phase punishment strategies (see Gibbons, 1992).  
 
BGM’s strategy specifications have the advantage of both being simple to analyse and 
making it possible to compare all four organizational forms within the same framework. In 
the modification studied here, it is simply assumed that specificity deters spot contracting 
from being a long-term option. Still, there are several reasons for making this modification. 
                                                 
4 BGM start up with a more general contract ),,,,( LLLHHLHH bbbbs , (i,j=H,L), but restrict it 
to ),,,( LLLLHLLHLHHLHHHH bbbbbbbb bbbb +=+=+=+= in order to simplify the comparative 
analysis. 
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First, it can be argued that the carrot and stick strategy is more realistic than the grim strategy, 
especially in buyer/supplier relationships with high levels of asset or investment specificity. It 
is difficult to understand why the parties would stick to spot governance forever after a 
contract breach when specificity makes relational contracting significantly more efficient than 
spot contracting.  Carrot and stick strategies are more in line with actual economic behaviour 
off the cooperation path. In the offshore industry, for example, contract breach often results in 
operators i) renegotiating the terms of the current project, (ii) searching for new long term 
trading partners, while trading directly in inferior spot markets iii) entering into a new long  
term contracts with either the old trading partner or a new one (see e.g the Norsok reports, 
1995). Second, analysing carrot and stick strategy equilibria is more appropriate if asset 
specificity is regarded as a significant explanatory variable.  In order to analyse the effect of 
asset specificity in long term contracts, the alternative market must be modelled as a real 
threat point, not merely a reference point for spot negotiations. In BGM the level of asset 
specificity does not affect the robustness of relational contracts. In the present paper, 
however, asset specificity does affect the parties’ temptation to renege on relational contracts. 
Third, both grim strategies and carrot and stick strategies yield the same surplus, for given 
actions, in equilibrium. But for sufficiently high levels of specificity, efficient relational 
contracts can be implemented for lower discount factors when the parties play the carrot and 
stick strategy than when they play the grim strategy. This provides an argument for studying 
carrot and stick strategies in the presence of specificity.  
 
In this paper, the strategy for U (D) is specified as follows: 
 
1. In period t, honour the terms of the relational contract ( HLHL bbs bb ,,,, ) if D (U) 
honoured in period t-1. 
2. In period t, honour the terms of the relational contract ( HLHL bbs bb ,,,, ) if there was no 
trade with D (U) in period t-1. 
3. In period t, refuse to trade with D (U) if the trade between the parties in period t-1 was 
accomplished by spot contracting. 
 
To “honour the terms of the relational contract” means for the upstream party to accept the 
bonuses offered and for the downstream party to pay the promised bonuses. We enter this 
game ex post quality realizations in period t. When the parties are to decide whether to honour 
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or renege on the contract, they know the quality realizations of  period t, but can only have 
expectations regarding the remaining periods. The parties honour the contract if the present 
value of honouring exceeds the present value of reneging. A relational contract is self-
enforcing if both parties choose to honour the contract ( HLHL bbs bb ,,,, ) for all possible 
realizations of iQ  and jP . The critical part of the analysis is to deduce the conditions for 
when the relational employment contract and the relational outsourcing contract are self-
enforcing. Technically, these are conditions for when the strategies specified above constitute 
subgame perfect Nash equilibria of relational contracts. See appendix on subgame perfection. 
 
Before we proceed, consider four additional assumptions:  First, it is assumed that both parties 
incur a switching cost v by trading in the alternative market when the product has already 
been produced for the purpose of trading in the specific relation. 5 They avoid this cost if they 
know ex ante that no trade will occur between the parties. Second, in contrast to BGM, it is 
assumed that ownership is fixed on the “punishment path”. This seems realistic as long as the 
strategies, in case of deviation, specify only one period of spot governance.  Only small 
negotiation costs would make a one-period ownership transfer inefficient (Halonen (2002) 
fixes ownership forever after deviation even in grim trigger strategies). Third, BGM assume 
that C(0) yields LQ always. But it is more realistic and thus assumed in this paper, that if the 
upstream party takes no costly actions, he can choose between realizing LQ and realizing zero 
values. This gives the upstream party a punishment possibility even if the downstream party  
owns the asset.6 Fourth, it is assumed that the downstream party’s valuation of the alternative  
market goods is equal to the price he has to pay. Hence, if the downstream party buys the 
good in the alternative market, he earns no surplus from this trade.7 None of these 
assumptions changes the quality of the results in this paper, but they are made both for 
analytical convenience and in order to make the upstream-downstream relationship as realistic 
as possible. 
 
 
                                                 
5 We can view these costs as  time costs or extra transport costs associated with the unexpected move from 
relational trade to alternative market trade.   
6 This assumption will not change the downstream payoff function in relational contracts since iQ will always be 
realized in relational contracts equlibria. Also note that this does not mean that upstream can hold-up the good in 
relational employment ex post realization. The choice of realizing LQ or zero is taken ex ante.  
7 BGM say nothing about this since the parties never trade in the alternative market in their model. 
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3.1  Relational employment 
 
If the upstream party is confident that the downstream party will honour the contract 
( HLHL bbs bb ,,,, ) then the upstream party will choose actions 
REa  that solve: 
( ) RELL
a
UcpbqbsMax º-D++D++ )()()( aaa bb  where LH bbb -=D , LH bbb -=D , and 
superscript (RE) denote relational employment. The expected downstream payoff is 
then ==--- )( REjii sbQE aab
RERE
L
RE
L
RE
L DpbqbsQqQ ºD--D---D+ )()()( aaa bb
so total surplus under relational employment is )()( REREL
RERERE cQqQDUS aa -D+=+º . 
 
Given that the downstream party always honours the contract, the upstream party will earn 
)( REji cbs a-++ b  in period t, and expect a total 
of ( ) RERERELREL Ucpbqbs dddd bb -- =-D++D++ 11 )()()( aaa  from future trade if he honours 
the contract. To make the different payoffs easy to compare, I distinguish between period t, 
period t+1 and all the remaining periods. The present value of honouring the relational 
employment contract is thus written  
 
++-++ REREji Ucbs db )(a
REUdd-1
2  . 
  
If the upstream party reneges on the contract in period t by refusing to accept the promised 
payment jib b+ (or refusing to make a promised payment if 0<+ jib b ), the trade is 
accomplished by spot contracting, where the downstream party, as the asset owner, just takes 
the good and leave the upstream party with nothing. According to the specified strategies, 
there is no trade between the parties in period t+1, so the upstream party earns nothing and 
bears no investment costs. In period t+2 the relational contract is re-established. The payoff 
after reneging is then 
 
RERE Ucs d
d
-+- 1
2
)(a . 
 
The upstream party will thus honour rather than renege on the relational employment contract 
when, for all values of i and j,  
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(1) ++ jib b
REUd 0³ . 
 
Given that the upstream party always honours the contract, the downstream party’s payoff 
from honouring the relational employment contract is 
 
RE
jii DsbQ d
ddb -++--- 1
RE 2D   . 
 
If the downstream party reneges on the contract in period t, he will just take the realized 
value, iQ , and pay nothing. In period t+1 the upstream party will refuse to produce the good, 
so the downstream party has to buy the good in the alternative market. He will not gain a 
surplus on this trade, since his valuation of this non-specific good is equal to the price he has 
to pay. In period t+2 the relational employment contract is re-established. The present value 
of reneging on the contract is thus simply 
 
RE
i DsQ d
d
-+- 1
2
 . 
 
The downstream party will honour rather than renege on the relational employment contract 
when, for all values of i and j, 
 
(2)   
RE
ji Db db £+  . 
 
(1) and (2) represent 8 constraints that have to hold in order for the relational employment 
contract to be self-enforcing. Combining these restrictions yields (see appendix):  
 
(3) RESb db £D+D . 
 
This is both a necessary and a sufficient constraint for the relational contract 
( HLHL bbs bb ,,,, ) to hold, since the parties can always choose a fixed salary s that satisfies  
both (1) and (2). The efficient relational employment contract maximizes total surplus, RES , 
subject to (3).  
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3.2 Relational outsourcing 
 
In relational outsourcing, if the upstream party is confident that the downstream party will 
honour the contract ( HLHL bbs bb ,,,, ) the upstream party chooses actions
ROa that 
solve ( ) ROLL
a
UcpbqbsMax º-D++D++ )()()( aaa bb  where superscript RO denotes 
relational outsourcing. The downstream party’s payoff is then )( ROjii bsQE aa =--- b  = 
RORO
L
RO
L
RO
L DpbqbsQqQ ºD--D---D+ )()()( aaa bb , so total surplus under relational 
outsourcing is )()( ROROL
RORORO cQqQDUS aa -D+=+º . 
 
If the upstream party honours the relational outsourcing contract he will receive 
 
++-++ ROROji Ucbs db )(a
ROUdd-1
2  . 
 
If the upstream party reneges on the contract in period t, trade is accomplished by spot 
contracting. Since the upstream party now owns the asset, the downstream party cannot just 
take the good. I assume, like BGM, that the parties set prices by means of 50:50 Nash 
negotiations, which yields )(2
1 vPQ ji -+ .
8 In period t+1, downstream refuses to trade with 
upstream. Anticipating this, upstream chooses actions AOa , which solve 
( ) AOLa UcPpPMax º-D+ )()( aa . In period t+2 the parties re-establish their relational 
contract.9  
 
The upstream party’s payoff after reneging is then 
 
)()(2
1 RO
ji cvPQs a--++
ROAO UU d
dd -++ 1
2
. 
 
                                                 
8 The downstream party will pay the upstream party the alternative value jP v-  plus half the surplus from trade 
with the downstream party: ( )12 ( )i jQ P v- - , i.e. ( )12 i jQ P v+ - . 
9 The strategy in which the no-trade-punishment is deferred until  period t+1 coincides with subgame perfect 
equilibrium for v exceeding a critical level (see Appendix). According to the specified strategies, the parties 
know that trade in the alternative market follows after spot governance. Hence, they avoid the switching cost v if 
they defer the trade in the alternative market from t until t+1. 
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The upstream party will thus honour the contract when, for all values of i and j, 
 
(4) jib b+
ROUd+ AOji UvPQ d+-+³ )(2
1 . 
 
If the downstream party honours the contract he will earn 
 
RO
jii DsbQ d
ddb -++--- 1
RO 2D   . 
 
If the downstream party reneges in period t, the parties agree on the 50:50 Nash price so that 
the downstream party earns )(2
1 vPQsQ jii -+-- . In period t+1 upstream refuses to trade 
with downstream, who has to buy the good in the alternative market and thus gains no 
surplus. The downstream party’s payoff after reneging is then 
 
RO
jii DvPQsQ d
d
-+-+-- 12
1 2)(  . 
 
The downstream party will thus honour the contract, for all values of i and j, when 
 
(5) )(2
1 vPQbD jiji
RO -+-+³ bd  
 
Combining (4) and (5) yields the following condition for the relational outsourcing contract to 
be self-enforcing (see appendix): 
 
(6) 1 12 2 ( )
RO AOb Q P S Ub dD - D + D - D £ -   
 
Like (3), (6) is both necessary and sufficient. The efficient relational outsourcing contract 
maximizes total surplus ROS  subject to (6).    
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4. Comparative analysis 
 
We can now compare relational outsourcing with relational employment. First, observe that 
(3) and (6) underscore BGM’s main proposition: The parties’ temptation to renege on a given 
relational contract depends on asset ownership.10 I will now show how asset and investment 
specificity affect the parties reneging temptations under different types of ownership. Define 
LL PQ -  as the level of asset specificity, and PQ D-D as the level of investment specificity.  
Now, observe that in relational outsourcing the value of the upstream party’s outside option, 
ºAOU )()( AOAOL cPpP aa -D+ , is part of the relational contract constraint. In relational 
employment, however, the outside option is equal to zero for any level of HP and LP . Hence, 
the levels of both asset specificity and investment specificity affect the relational outsourcing 
constraint, but not the relational employment constraint.  In relational outsourcing the 
downstream party’s temptation to renege is lower than in relational employment, since he 
cannot just take the good, but has to bargain a spot price with the upstream owner. On the 
other hand, the upstream party’s temptation to renege is higher under relational outsourcing 
than under relational employment, because of his outside options. Under relational 
outsourcing, increased specificity will thus reduce the relative value of the upstream party’s 
outside option, and thereby give scope for better relational contracts. 
 
From (3) and (6) we observe that increasing incentive intensity, given by bDD ,b , increases 
the total temptation to renege on a contract. Low bonuses may induce the upstream party to 
renege, while high bonuses may induce the downstream party to renege. Moreover, we 
observe that if AOU  is sufficiently low, then there is scope for higher-powered incentives in 
relational outsourcing than in relational employment. Hence, if the level of asset specificity is 
sufficiently high, which implies that RORO US -  is high, and high-powered incentives are 
desirable, then relational employment is inefficient compared to relational outsourcing. We 
gain intuition by thinking through an incentive for downstream to increase the specificity of 
an asset.  If the upstream party possesses an asset that is highly valuable to a broad market, 
downstream may wish to acquire the upstream party’s asset in order to avoid strategic 
behaviour. The problem then is that the downstream party’s incentive to cheat on upstream 
                                                 
10 Olsen (1996) has a related result, showing in a two-period model that the choice of renegotiating a contract 
depends on organizational form  
  
 
17  
increases, so upstream may call for lower-powered incentive schemes and higher fixed 
salaries. But if higher-powered incentives are desirable, he can make tailor-made investments 
in the asset in a manner that inc reases its internal, but not its external value. Then he can 
safely outsource the asset to upstream, achieving higher-powered incentives without running 
the risk of upstream opportunism. 
 
I will now derive a formal result showing that relational outsourcing can be an efficient 
response to high levels of specificity.  Assume that the two gradients of partial derivates 
niaa FB
a
pFB
a
q
ii
,...,2,1),(),( =
¶
¶
¶
¶  are linearly independent (superscript FB denotes first-best). 
Then a first-best solution can only be achieved if Qb D=D  and 0=Db .  
 
Given (3), first-best can be achieved under a relational employment contract if 
 
RE
FBFB
L cQqQ
Q
dd =
-D+
D
³
)()( aa
.
 
 
 
Given (6), first-best can be achieved under a relational outsourcing contract if 
 
RO
AOAO
L
FBFB
L cPpPcQqQ
PQ
dd =
+D---D+
D+D
³
)()()()(
)(2
1
aaaa
. 
 
Hence, to be able to implement first-best at equal or lower discount factors in the outsourcing 
contract than in the employment contract, we must have RERO dd £ , that is 
 
(7) ( ) ( ) 0)()()
2
()()( ³-D+-
D
D-D
-D+ AOAOL
FBFB
L cPpPQ
PQ
cQqQ aaaa . 
 
We can then state: 
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Proposition 1: i) Assume that there is investment specificity, defined as PQ D>D . If asset 
specificity is sufficiently large, in the sense that LQ is sufficiently high and/or LP  is 
sufficiently low, then there exist critical discount factors 0>> RORE dd  such that for ROd d>  
relational outsourcing is first-best and thus at least as efficient as relational employment, and 
for RORE ddd >>  relational outsourcing is strictly more efficient than relational 
employment. ii) Assume that there is no investment specificity ( PQ D<D ). Then for any level 
of asset specificity, i.e. for any level of LQ  and LP , there exist critical discount factors 
0>> RERO dd  such that for REdd >  relational employment is first-best and thus at least as 
efficient as relational outsourcing, and for RERO ddd >> relational employment is strictly 
more efficient than relational outsourcing.  
 
Proof: Given PQ D>D , the left hand side of (7) is strictly increasing in LQ  and strictly 
decreasing in LP . Given PQ D<D  , (7) never holds. 
 
I will show, for specific functions, that (7) is also a valid condition in second-best solutions. 
That is, given (7), relational outsourcing is always an equally efficient or more efficient 
solution than relational employment. I assume, like BGM, that the upstream party can take 
two actions: ),( 21 aa=a , and that the production functions are linear and the cost function 
quadratic: 
 
(8) 
2
22
12
12
1
21
221121
221121
),(
),(
),(
aaaac
apapaap
aqaqaaq
+=
+=
+=
  
where 0,,, 2121 ³ppqq and 1221 pqpq ¹ . 
 
The first-best actions are then Qqa FB D= 11  and Qqa
FB D= 22 . In both the outsourcing contract 
and the employment contract, the upstream party chooses to maximize 
2
22
12
12
1
22112211 )()( aaapapbaqaqbs LL --D+++D+++ bb , so that bD+D= 111 pbqa  
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and bD+D= 222 pbqa . A first-best solution can then only be achieved if Qb D=D  and 
0=Db  
 
In order to keep it simple, I assume that 012 == pq . The agent can take one action that 
affects Q and another action that affects P. 
 
Given (8), (7) can be written 
 
(7’) ( ) 0)()
2
( 214
122
22
1 ³D-DD-D--
D
D-D
PQQqPpP
Q
PQ
Q LL . 
 
Given (7’), first-best cannot be achieved if 
 
(9) RO
LL PpPQqQ
PQ
dd =
D--D+
D+D
<
22
22
122
12
1
2
1 )(
. 
 
Proposition 2: Given (7’) and (8), relational outsourcing is at least as efficient as relational 
employment if ROdd ³ and strictly more efficient than relational employment if ROdd < .   
 
Proof: see appendix. 
 
The propositions suggest that outsourcing may be an efficient response to high levels of 
specificity. Note the relationship between asset specificity, investment specificity and 
governance in proposition 1. If there is no investment specificity, relational outsourcing is 
always an inefficient governance mechanism compared to relational employment. Moreover, 
if there is investment specificity, relational outsourcing is an efficient response to increased 
asset specificity. 
 
The propositions help elucidate anecdotic empirical evidence and case studies showing that 
non- integration is highly compatible with asset/investment specificity. And further, that 
specificity can actually be beneficial for non- integrated solutions. The proposition may also 
cast some light on empirical studies questioning other aspects of “Williamsonian” 
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explanations of integration and outsourcing. Anderson, Glenn and Sedatole (2000) make an 
interesting empirical study of the relationship between asset complexity and outsourcing 
decisions. Using data on 156 sourcing decisions for process tooling (dies) of a new car 
program, they found that attributes that according to transaction cost economics favoured 
“insourcing”, favours outsourcing if the parties engage in relational contracting. In particular, 
they found that firms outsourced parts with high levels of complexity, and insourced simple 
parts with low levels of complexity. Also, parts with high levels of “design constraints” were 
more likely to be outsourced than parts with low design constraint levels. Problems of 
strategic behaviour from these relational-dependent external suppliers were relatively small, 
and field investigations suggested that the external suppliers were more responsive to 
incentives than internal suppliers. 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
The model in this paper identifies local non-monotonic relationships between asset specificity 
and vertical integration. In vertically integrated firms, there will always be some kind of 
complementarity between the assets, and the assets of an upstream party vertically integrated 
with its downstream buyer will always to a certain extent be specific to the downstream 
party’s needs. If there is no asset specificity or investment specificity, we have a competitive 
market with no need for contractual incentive schemes. Then the “old rule” would apply, 
saying that the best manager of an asset is its owner. So if the upstream party is the one taking 
actions, he should also own the asset. But if we are in an economic environment with 
significant levels of specificity, as assumed in the model of this paper, then the relationship 
between asset specificity and vertical integration becomes more complex. To a certain extent, 
specificity may induce integration, as the downstream party wishes to avoid unfavourable 
strategic behaviour from upstream. But if the level of specificity is sufficiently high, the 
relative value of external trade is reduced, and the incentive for upstream to behave 
opportunistically is reduced as well. Integration may then be an inefficient governance 
solution compared with non- integration: If the parties can engage in relational contracts, and 
the surplus from external trade is relatively small compared with the surplus from trade in the 
specific relationship, the parties will be able to design higher-powered incentive schemes if 
upstream owns the asset than if downstream owns the asset.  
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APPENDIX 
 
1. The conditions for honouring the relational employment contract 
 
The upstream party’s condition is given by 
 
(1) ++ jib b
REUd 0³  
 
The downstream party’s condition is given by 
 
(2) REji Db db £+   
 
Since i=H,L and j= H,L, each of these two conditions contains four constraints. We see that 
the high quality realisation always imposes the binding constraint on the downstream party, 
while low quality realisation imposes the relevant constraint on the upstream party. The 
relevant constraints are then: 
 
)( LLb b+ +
REUd 0³  
)( bb D++D+ LL bb
REDd£   
 
Multiplying the upstream constraint by (-1) and adding the downstream constraint yields the 
following necessary and sufficient condition for honouring the relational employment 
contract:  
 
(3) RESb db £D+D  
  
2. The conditions for honouring the relational outsourcing contract 
 
The upstream party’s condition is given by: 
 
(4) jib b+
ROUd+ AOji UvPQ d+-+³ )(2
1  
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The downstream party’s condition is given by: 
 
(5) )(2
1 vPQbD jiji
RO -+-+³ bd  
 
It is now less obvious which constraints  are binding. But there will always be two constraints 
at most that are binding. We see that it depends on the differences: bQ D-D2
1  and 
bD-DP2
1 .  
 
When bQ D>D2
1  and bD>DP2
1 , the relevant constraints are: 
AO
LL UvPPQQ d+-D++D+ )(2
1 RO
LL Ubb dbb +D++D+£  
( ))()(21 ROLLL aQqQvPQ D++-+ d ( ))()( ROLROLLL apabqbb bbdb D++D+++³  
 
When bQ D>D2
1  and bD<DP2
1 , the relevant constraints are: 
AO
LL
RO
LL UvPQQUbb db +-+D+³++D+ )(2
1  
)(2
1 vPQbD LLLLL
RO -+-D++³ bbd  
 
When bQ D<D2
1  and bD>DP2
1 , the relevant constraints are: 
AO
LL
RO
HLL UvPQQUb dbb +-+D+³+D++ )(2
1  
)(2
1 vPQbbD LLLL
RO -+-+D+³ bd  
 
When bQ D<D2
1  and bD<DP2
1 , the relevant constraints are: 
AO
LL
RO
LL UvPQQUb db +-+D+³++ )(2
1  
)(2
1 vPQbbD LLLL
RO -+-D++D+³ bbd  
 
Multiplying the downstream party’s constraints by (-1) and adding the upstream party’s 
constraints yields a necessary and sufficient condition for each pair of constraints:  
 
(6)  ( )AORO USPQb -£D-D+D-D db 2121  
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3. The conditions for subgame perfect equilibria: 
 
From Selten (1965), a Nash equilibrium is subgame perfect if the players’ strategies constitute 
a Nash equilibrium in every subgame. In this game we have an infinite number of subgame 
divided into three categories: The games that start after trade governed by a relational 
contract, the games that start after trade governed by a spot contract, and the games that start 
after no trade between the parties / trade in the alternative market. The carrot and stick 
strategies constitute subgame perfect equilibrium if U (D), in case of D (U) deviation in 
period t, finds it optimal to trade under spot governance, S, in period t; refuses to trade with D 
(U), i.e trades in the alternative market, A, in period t+1; and returns to relational contracting, 
R, in period t+2. We can write this “punishment path” ( ...,,, 321 +++ tttt RRAS ). U (D)’s feasible 
set of trade actions depends on D (U)’s offer. At the end of each period, the players have 
taken the same action, but in terms of feasibility A dominates S which dominates R. 
 
There are an infinite number of strategies specifying punishment paths that could constitute 
subgame perfect equilibria. With the strategies specified here, we can, however reduce the 
relevant paths to ( ,...,,, 321 +++ tttt RRAS ) and ( ,...,, 21 ++ ttt RRA ). Recall that when identifying 
the conditions for subgame perfection, it is commonly assumed that U (D) assumes that D (U) 
follows his initial strategy after deviations. Hence, it is not possible for U (D) after D (U) 
deviation in period t to postpone the trade in the alternative market, for instance to play 
( ...,,,, 4321 ++++ ttttt RRASS ,) since according to his initial strategy, D (U) will play A in period 
t+1. Hence, in addition to the strategy specified path ( ,...,,, 321 +++ tttt RRAS ), we are left with 
the “competing” path ( ,...,, 21 ++ ttt RRA ). No path will include more than one period of trade in 
the alternative market since A yields the lowest surplus. Also note that in the model it is 
assumed that a player who reneges on the relational contract offers spot contracting instead of 
direct trade in the alternative market. Then if ( ,...,,, 321 +++ tttt RRAS ) dominates 
( ,...,, 21 ++ ttt RRA ), deviation starting with spot contracting dominates direct trade in the 
alternative market.  
 
Relational outsourcing: If the downstream party reneges, the upstream party’s punishment 
path ( ,...,,, 321 +++ tttt RRAS ) dominates ( ,...,, 21 ++ ttt RRA ) if 
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(A.1) ROj
AO
ji UvPUvPQ dd +-³+-+ )(2
1   
i.e. )()(2 ji
AORO PQUUv ---³ d . 
 
If the upstream party reneges, the downstream party’s punishment path ( ...,,, 321 +++ tttt RRAS ) 
dominates ( ,...,, 21 ++ ttt RRA ) if 
 
(A.2) +-³-+- vvPQQ jii )(2
1 RO Dd  
i.e. R O2 13 3 D ( )i jv Q Pd³ - -  
 
 
For sufficiently high switching costs, the upstream party (downstream party) will play 
( ,...,,, 321 +++ tttt RRAS ) in case of downstream party (upstream party) deviation. For the 
strategies to constitute subgame perfect equilibrium, (A.1) and (A.2) must hold for the critical 
discount factor that is necessary for (6) to hold with equality. Note that for sufficiently high 
levels of specificity (A.1) and (A.2) hold for v=0. 
 
Relational employment: In relational employment, the upstream party cannot trade in the 
alternative market, but he can refuse to trade by not producing the good. But if the 
downstream party reneges on the contract in period t, the upstream party cannot refuse to 
trade with the downstream party in this period, since he has already realized iQ . Hence the 
upstream party cannot play and is thus “forced” to follow the strategy-specified punishment 
path ( ,...,,, 321 +++ tttt RRAS ). 
  
If the upstream party reneges in period t, the downstream party have no incentive to 
play( ,...,, 21 ++ ttt RRA ) since in period t he can just take the realized LQ . Hence, he follows the 
strategy-specified punishment path ( ,...,,, 321 +++ tttt RRAS ). 
 
Conclusion: The strategies constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium if (3), (6), (A.1) and 
(A.2) hold. 
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4. Proof of proposition 2 
 
For notational simplicity: 
y
xb
=D
=D
b
 
1
2
L
L
Q Q
P P
Q z
P w
q q
p p
=
=
D =
D =
=
=
 
 
Given the functional forms specified in (8) and the assumption that 2 1 0q p= = , the surplus 
from a relational contract is given by 
 
22
2
122
2
12),( ypxqxzqQyxS --+=  
 
The outsourcing constraint is given by 
 
)( 222
122
2
122
2
12
2
1
2
1 wpPypxqxzqQwyzx ----+£-+- d  
 
Geometry suggests that the solution is found in the area xz <2
1
 and yw >2
1 . The 
maximization problem can then be written 
 
yx
Max
,
 ),( yxS  
 
subject to 
)( 222
122
2
122
2
12
2
1
2
1 wpPypxqxzqQywzx ----+£-+- d  
Solving for x and y , and then substituting them into the surplus function yields 
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( )
( )
222
2222222222222
222
2222222
)()(21)(
22)2()(
2
1
pq
wzpPQpwpzqpqppq
pq
pwpPpwzpq
S RO
d
ddd
d
dd
+--++-++
+
--+++
=
 
Let us now look at the relational employment contract. The constraint is given by 
 
)( 222
122
2
12 ypxqxzqQyx --+£+ d  
 
Geometry suggests that 0=y . Assuming that 0³x , the maximization problem can be written 
 
)0,(xSMax
x
 
 
subject to )( 222
12 xqxzqQx -+£ d  
 
Solving for x  and then substituting into the surplus function yields: 
 
22
2222422 2121
d
dddd
q
Qqzqzqzq
S RE
++-+-
=  
 
 
Will now show that when (7’) and (9) hold, we have 
 
.
( , , , , , , ) 0
RO RES S
i e
f P q p z w Qd
³
³
 
 
where  
 
2 2 2( , , , , , , ) 2 ( ( ) )RO REf P q p z w Q p q S P Sd d= - =  
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2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 4 2 2 2 2
2 2
2 ( ) ( ) 1 2 ( ) ( )
2 ( 2 1 2 )
q p z q p w q p P q p w q
p q q p z q w p Q P p w z p p
p q z q z q Q
d d d d
d d d
d d d
- + + + -
é ù+ + - + + - - + +ë û
- - + +
 
 
From (7’) we have 
 
2 2 2 2 21 1 1
02 2 4 4( ) ( )
z w
zP Q p w zwq q z P
-£ - + - =  
 
Will now show that 
0( , , , , , , ) ( , , , , , , ) 0f P q p z w Q f P q p z w Qd d³ ³  
for every d for the special case 1p q= = . 
 
For 1p q= =  we have 
2 21 1 1
0 2 2 4 4( , , ) ( ) ( )
z w
zP w z Q Q w zw z
-= - + -  
and 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2
( , ,1,1, , , )
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 )
2 ( 2 1 2 )
f P z w Q
z w P w z w Q P w z
z z Q
d
d d d d d d d d d d
d d d
=
- + + + - + - + + - - -
- - + +
 
 
Note that 0 0P ³ requires w z£ . For 0( , , )P P w z Q= we get  
 
0
2 2 21 1 1
2 2
2 2 2 2 21 1 1
2 2
( , ( , , ),1,1, , , )
( ) ( ) 2
2 2 2 ( ) ( ) 2 ( 2 ) 2 1
( , , ) ( , , ) 2 2 2 2 ( , , ) ( , , ) 2 ( , , ) 1
z
z
f P w z Q z w Q
Q z w z Q z
Q z z Q z w z Q z
A z Q w B z Q B z Q A z Q w C z Q
d
d d d d
d d d d d d
d d d d d
=
é ù- + - + + -ë û
é ù+ + + - + + - - + - +ë û
= + - + + - - +
 
 
where  
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[ ]1 12( , , ) 1 ( )
( , , ) ( , , )
( , , ) 2 ( , , )
zA z Q Q z
B z Q zA z Q
C z Q zA z Q
d d d
d d
d d
= - +
= -
= -
 
 
Hence, it is shown that 
 
0( , ( , , ),1,1, , , )
( , , )( ) 2 2 2 2 ( , , ) ) 2 1 2 ( , , )
f P w z Q z w Q
A z Q w z A z Q w z zA z Q
d
d d d= - - + - + - -
 
 
For second best solutions we have from (9) that  
 
1 1
2 2
02 2 2 2 21 1
02 2
2 ( , )
( , , ) 2
z w z
z Q
Q q z P w z Q p w Q z
d d
+
< = =
+ - - +
 
 
Hence 
[ ]
0
1 1 1
2( , , ) 1 ( ) (1 ) (0, )mzA z Q Q z Add d d d d= - + = - Î , 
where 
0
21 1
4 8 (2 )m zA Q zd= = +  
 
Must also have expressions inside roots nonnegative 
2 ( , , )( ) 0A z Q w zd- + ³  i.e. 2( , , )A z Qw z d+ £ , 
and 
1 2 ( , , ) 0zA z Qd- ³  i.e. 12( , , ) zA z Qd £  
Hence, we must have 
1
2m zA £  i.e. 
21
4 (2 ) 1Q z+ £  
 
Note that 
(2 ) 2
( ) 2 2 2 2 ( ) 0
(2 )w
Aw Az
A w z A w z A
Aw Az
¶
¶
- - - +é ù- - + - + = - <ë û - -
 
 
Hence, the expression is minimal when w is maximal, i.e. for  
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{ }2( , , )min , A z Qw z z zd= - =  
 
where last equality follows because 1 2A z³ . This yields 
  
0( , ( , , ),1,1, , , ) 2( 1 2 1 ) 0f P w z Q z w Q a ad ³ - + + - ³   
 
where 1 2 ( , , ) (0,1)a zA z Qd= - Î , and the last inequality follows because expression is 
decreasing in a on (0,1). 
 
It remains to consider 
 
2 2 2 2 2 2
2
2 2 2 2 2 2
( 2 2 2 ) 2
( , ,1,1, , , ) 2
( 2 2 2 )
P
z w Q P w z
f P z w Q
z w Q P w z
d d d d d d
d d
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¶
¶
- - + + - - - +
= -
- + + - - -
 
Expression inside root is  
 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( 2 2 2 ) 2 ( ) 2 ( ) ( )z w Q P w z z w Q P w zd d d d d d d d dé ù- + + - - - = + - + - - +ë û  
 
We must have  
 
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
z w z w
Q q z P p w Q z P w
d
+ +
< =
+ - - + - -
 
 
i.e. 
 
2 21 1 1 1
2 2 2 2( )Q z P w z wd + - - < +  
 
It follows that expression inside root above is < 2, and hence that 0P f
¶
¶ < .  
 
Thus we have shown 
0( , ,1,1, , , ) ( , ,1,1, , , ) 0f P z w Q f P z w Qd d³ ³  
for 0P P£ . 
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